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In this article, I investigate India’s two-pronged policy approach, which combines security and 
development intervention to address the root cause and symptoms of left wing extremism. 
While the two policy sets are meant for two very distinct policy subjects – the angry 
extremist and the neglected poor – I  argue that in renewing state legitimacy against 
internal dissent, development goals are made to coincide with traditional security concerns for 
state survival and stability. In this article, I unpack three representations of the problem of 
left wing extremism – as terrorism, as a parallel regime and as a ‘political disorder’ – in 
relation to the particular policy responses they each advocate. Through these three 
representational frames, the eﬀects that the security imperative has on the idea and practice 
of development are uncovered. 
 
 
Introductio
n 
In  the last decade, while India  has successfully positioned itself as one of  the 
emerging giants in the global economy, inside its borders it has had to cope with the 
rise of left wing extremism. The Naxalite Movement, which is the name given to this 
Maoist-inspired rebellion, is  considered to  be  the  most  serious internal security 
challenge the Indian state has ever faced, and is a violent reminder of the need to 
resolve long-standing disputes over land displacement,  poverty and social oppres- 
sion. In its chequered history, the Naxalite Movement has been a testimony to the 
resilience of the underbelly that has paid the price for India’s economic success. For 
the rural peasantry and forest tribes, the Indian state has made available a set of 
aﬃrmative measures to help them integrate with the mainstream. But provisions for 
reserved public sector jobs, seats in elected oﬃces and educational institutions do not 
entirely ﬁll the gaps created by grinding poverty and exploitation, and thus reasons 
to carry out a struggle outside the parliamentary system remain. As  a result, there 
is –  on  the one hand  –  a  preponderance of  politics surrounding the reservation 
system, wherein minorities listed in the schedule category are mobilised such that 
they use their ascribed identity to bargain for resources from the state and form a 
political majority of their own (as typiﬁed by the Bahujan Samaj Party). On the other 
hand, there is the politics of left wing extremism, which arms some of the poorest and 
most dispossessed amongst India’s marginalised communities with the ideology of 
violence. 
 
The Naxalite Movement began in May  1967 in a remote village called Naxalbari 
in Darjeeling district,  when a group of tea plantation workers revolted against the 
landed gentry. The embers of violent revolt that this sleepy hill-station had sparked 
soon spread like wildﬁre to neighbouring districts of West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra 
Pradesh, where similar peasant movements found a new inspiration in the ideology 
of armed rebellion. By the end of the Emergency in 1977, Naxalism was believed to 
have been completely liquidated. Eventually,  however, surviving activists revived 
and consolidated the movement and it now looms in regions which host some of the 
poorest people and the richest resource bases in India, stretching from its main nerve 
 centre in Andhra  Pradesh and Bihar to adjoining districts in Orissa,  Chattisgarh, 
Jharkhand and West Bengal and moving further out into Madhya  Pradesh, Kerala 
and Maharashtra. 
 
The Naxalite Movement is – in a sense – the Frankenstein that a feudal cum neo- 
liberal economy  has  generated. Many   years of  land  displacement,  poverty and 
gaping inequality, combined with the Indian state’s recourse to violence to contain 
the space for public dissent, has given way to this form of political violence. 
Typically,  the  Indian  state’s  response to  the  problem of  Naxalite  violence has 
involved a dual policy of treating the symptoms and the root cause. While the 
symptoms  are  understood  as  anger  and  frustration  expressed through  violent 
extremism, warranting more policing and militarised means of containment, the root 
cause is explained through  the relative under-development and  backwardness in 
some regions of  the country,  leading to  policies for  speedier and  more welfare- 
oriented development. In taking latent responsibility for the growing brand of left 
wing extremism, the Indian state proposes a programme that brings together the law 
and order approach with the socio-economic one.  At  once, it allows the state to 
protect itself from violent rebellion, creating a safe and stable environment for its 
citizens, while also reaching out to those angry and neglected millions who remain 
untouched by the golden hand of development. 
 
This  dual  approach  could  be  a  sign of  hope  for  some.  At  least,  despite its 
contested ideology of violence, the Naxalite  Movement has brought some sense of 
urgency to  resolve long-neglected problems. It  may  seem that  it  highlights  the 
negative consequences of development and sanctions the importance of the welfare 
state, even as the Indian economy opens itself to a market-based neo-liberal model. 
However, in this article, I  aim to problematise this two-pronged policy.  The ﬁrst 
issue that I raise is to do with the logic of this approach. If  the policies have been 
designed to address the same problem – namely the rise of left wing extremism – then 
how does the policy discourse distinguish between two objects of intervention? In 
other words, how does state policy diﬀerentiate between the oﬀender who will meet 
the coercive arm of the state and the victim who will receive the welfare arm? This 
question is part  of  a  wider issue concerning how the securitisation of  problems 
related to  poverty and displacement transforms the idea and practice of 
development. Does it highlight the importance of welfare and reform in the existing 
development programmes? Or does it make development goals coincide with security 
goals, such that they are both ultimately aimed at state survival and maintaining the 
existing system? 
 
Generally,  the linking of development goals with security concerns has at least 
two potential implications on the overall development agenda. One is that further  
coercive measures might be taken in the name of development, wherein the security 
imperative overrides the emancipatory goals that development carries. The other is 
that there may be a broadening of the security discourse – as we see in the human 
security agenda – such that it covers various facets of human survival from poverty 
and inequality, to health,  education and freedom from fear and discrimination. 
 
In  my investigation of  the Indian  state’s two pronged policy  of  security and 
development, I  am  not  attempting to  argue that  security discourse is inevitably 
coercive. Rather,  I  am contesting the notion that the two sets of  policies can be 
considered as separable from each other. In fact, in the Indian state policy towards 
the Naxalite movement, what we ﬁnd is that development and security goals coincide 
to the extent that development initiatives are collapsed within wider interests. This 
 D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 
by
 
[U
n
iv
er
sit
y 
O
f S
u
rr
ey
] a
t 0
8:
38
 
15
 
M
ar
ch
 
20
13
 
serves as a means of restoring the legitimacy of the developmental state and ensuring 
state survival amidst violent resistance. 
 
The Indian state’s recourse to a policy that combines security with development 
has to be viewed against the context of the neo-liberal restructuring which the Indian 
economy has undergone over the past 25 years. While the Indian  state has been 
prompt in instituting policies that favour private investment, industrial growth, 
infrastructure development and a shift towards agricultural exports, initiatives for 
land   reform,  rehabilitation  and   resettlement policies,  poverty  alleviation  and 
protection against corruption and discrimination have been much slower. 
 
The  Naxalite  Movement  has proliferated in these circumstances. Rather  than 
understanding this movement as an indication of  some of  the problems with the 
mainstream economic policy, the Indian state views the movement as an obstacle to 
the successful functioning of its economic order. The result is that internal dissenters 
are taken as the enemy within, who have to be ﬂushed out as soon as possible for 
development to continue to show its results. While this has severely contained the 
space for debate and negotiation over development issues, it has also resulted in the 
creation of policies that are mainly oriented towards sustaining the existing 
development regime. 
 
Over the past seven years, successive annual plans from the Ministry of Home 
Aﬀairs have standardised the socio-economic measures to contain Naxalism around 
road construction, health care reform, decentralisation of  local  governments, job 
guarantees and funding for development of  backward areas. These initiatives are 
intended to increase the speed with which development reaches remote areas that 
have not so far experienced the beneﬁts of modernisation and struggle to catch up 
with the pace of  growth in  the rest of  the country.  The  Naxalite  Movement  is 
believed to ﬂourish out of people’s frustration and ignorance of the success of India’s 
development regime. Therefore, steady and urgent attempts by the state to show 
development activities in these regions would result in the people themselves forcing 
the Naxalites to leave. Through these policies, development is used as an instrument 
to win back people’s loyalty to their state and defeat the Naxalites.  It must also be 
noted that some of these remote under developed regions are also the richest sources 
of  minerals and forest reserves, which explains why some of  the measures taken 
under the socio-economic approach are also constitutive of initiatives to encourage 
more private investment in these areas. 
 
To  sum up,  securitisation of  development has to  a  large extent restricted the 
avenues for criticism. It has hardened around repressive measures  against internal 
dissenters – the so-called anti-development  terrorists – who are considered to be the 
main  obstruction  to  the  successful implementation of  the  state’s  development  
programme.  The  very  presence of  such  an  internal  enemy allows  for  coercive 
measures to  be taken wherever local  resistance against development intervention 
takes place.  Events in Nandigram  in West Bengal  in 2007 –  when the state 
government came down heavily on  protests against  expropriation of  land  by  a 
MNC – and the ongoing  Operation  Green  Hunt  in the jungles of  Chattisgarh  – 
where Maoists as well as innocent tribals are indiscriminately attacked to pave the 
way for a private takeover of forest and mineral reserves – are stark reminders of this 
situation. 
 
 
 
  
 
It has also resulted in the narrowing of the problem of development to people’s 
inaccessibility and ignorance of  the beneﬁts that development can bring. The 
emphasis has shifted to integrating regions and people’s consent with the overall 
development machinery, so that more inroads for state-private intervention can be 
made without facing much local resistance. As a result, continuing issues of poverty, 
inequality and displacement due to development are pushed further to the margins of 
the development agenda. 
 
My  investigation is inspired by policy as discourse theory, which takes the 
representation of   problems  for  which  policies  are  designed as  constitutive  of 
the process of policy making (see Hawkesworth 1988; Shapiro 1997; Bacchi 2000). 
The way in which the problem of Naxalism is constructed determines the subjectivity 
of  the target groups, de-lineates the issues that can be acted upon while silencing 
others and determines the scope for change and redressal. 
 
A  second inﬂuence for my analysis comes from the Copenhagen School  of 
Security studies, which considers securitization as  the process whereby (through 
speech acts) issues are positioned as an  existential threat to  a  particular referent 
object and  accepted as such by  a  relevant audience, in turn enabling emergency 
measures (Buzan and  Waever 1997; Buzan  et al.  1998; Williams 2003). Thought 
about in this way, securitisation stands for a discursive process that takes an issue 
from  the  level  of   ‘normal  deliberative politics’  to  ‘national   crisis’  and  ‘state 
survival’,  where speed rather than  restraint, unanimity  rather than  debate and 
short-term rather than long-term goals become the norm. The securitisation of left 
wing extremism, for instance, has key implications on development decision- 
making, as it involves the restoration of state legitimacy against an internal enemy, 
which strikes where the state is weakest –  its failure to  deliver basic services to 
correct relative inequality  and  displacement.  How  does  securitisation allow  for 
more coercive measures to be taken in the name of development? What ideas and 
measures of  development are produced from  this link  between security and 
development? 
 
I will attempt to answer these questions by assessing three diﬀerent representa- 
tions of  the problem of  the Naxalite  Movement.  Each  of  these representations  is 
related to a particular policy alternative. They are: the Naxalite  Movement as 
terrorism, the Naxalite Movement as a parallel regime to the state and the Naxalite 
Movement as political disorder. Before I take up each in turn, let us look at how left 
wing extremism has come to the particular historical juncture that we witness today. 
 
 
A Phoenix from the ashes – the fall and rise of left wing extremism in India, 
1965–2009 
 
When in September  2004 two of the biggest Naxalite parties, the People’s War (PW) 
and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) merged to form the CPI(Maoist), it was 
  
recorded as a  landmark moment in the history of  the Naxalite  Movement.  It  is 
estimated that  their  combined  strength amounts  to  about  9000–10,000 armed 
ﬁghters with access to about 6500 ﬁrearms and with possibly a further 40,000 full- 
time cadres (Economist  2006). This  merger was one  amongst  other events that 
formed the backdrop of Prime Minister Manmohan  Singh’s speech on the occasion 
of India’s Independence Day in August 2006, when he declared that ‘. . .the problem 
of Naxalism is the single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country’. This 
remark captured the attention of many security analysts who soon began to discuss 
what was once thought of  as a  thinly spread out  peasant rebellion in the tribal 
dominated districts of the country, with the same level of priority as insurgency in 
Kashmir  and the North  East  (see Podder 2007; Nayak  2008; Iyer 2009; Strategic 
Comments 2010). 
 
This  merger was the result of  a  series of  uniﬁcation initiatives taken  up  by 
Naxalite factions since the late 1990s. One member in this partnership, the PW,  was 
formed  in  August   1998 after  the  CPI(ML)   Party  Unity   (PU)   –  which  had  a 
stronghold in the Jehanabad and Gaya  districts of Bihar – merged with the People’s 
War Group  (PWG), which was highly inﬂuential in Andhra Pradesh. The other half 
of the partnership, the MCC – which was mainly active in Bihar – had formed an 
alliance with the Revolutionary Communist  Centre of India-Maoists  in 2003. The 
MCC’s beginnings go as far back as 1969, the early stages of the Naxalite movement 
when a group of leaders including Kanu  Sanyal disagreed with Charu Mazumdar’s 
decision to discontinue Dakshin Desh, the party journal, and thus formed their own 
party. On the other hand, the PWG was formed in 1980 by Kondapalli Seetharamiah 
when he broke oﬀ from the CPI(ML), which is the parent organization of the 
Naxalite  movement. Over the years, both parties have, to an extent, earned a 
reputation for being hard-liners who stuck to eschewing parliamentary practices for 
armed agrarian revolution. Since the PWG had already established a parallel regime 
in Andhra Pradesh, its merger with MCC in Bihar meant that it would have a wider 
territorial reach, and would deﬁne the dominant vein of the Naxalite movement in 
India. Kujur  (2008) of the Institute of Peace and Conﬂict Studies in Delhi considers 
the tactical line of these parties as one of the main reasons why the Naxalite 
Movement has come to be considered as an internal security problem. 
 
Other events which add to the thesis that the Naxalite  movement is a serious 
security challenge include: the formation of a network of Maoist  parties in South 
Asia  called the Co-ordination  Committee of  Maoist  Parties and Organisations of 
South Asia (CCOMPASA), of which the PWG and MCC are also a part; the active 
links with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and rumours of further links with 
ISI  in Pakistan and the Communist Parties in Sri Lanka;  and ﬁnally the Compact 
Revolutionary Zone – more popularly known as the Red Corridor – that comprises 
the 170 districts under Naxalite control and which could potentially break away the 
resource rich regions from the rest of the country. 
 
But  how did a  movement which began with one incident of  armed revolt in 
Naxalbari  and was crushed within 72 days by the West Bengal police come to this 
stage? For one, the Naxalbari episode in May 1967 coincided with major ideological 
rifts within the Communist movement in India (Banerjee 1980). While most in the 
CPI(M) chose the option of participating in elections to bring about the democratic 
revolution, others within the party saw this as a  moment of  revisionism and co- 
option and chose to carry out the armed revolution outside the auspices of the party. 
Charu Mazumdar, who was the key ﬁgure to lead this initiative, formed the All India 
  
Coordination Committee in November 1967, which was renamed as the CPI(ML) in 
May  1969. Some  members of  the CPI(M) in West Bengal,  Andhra  Pradesh and 
Bihar joined this new party while others, such as the MCC led by Kanu  Sanyal and 
the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Party (APRCP) led by Nagi Reddy, 
supported the ideology but chose to continue with their independent movements. 
Interestingly, the carriers of the original party formed by Charu  Mazumdar  – the 
CPI(ML) – are now seen as the revisionists, while the more recent avatars of  the 
APRCP and the MCC, who have formed the CPI(Maoist), are the main political 
base of the contemporary revolution. 
 
By 1975, most of the Naxalite factions in West Bengal and adjoining Bihar were 
assumed to have been liquidated with the help of the state’s law and order apparatus. 
The counter-insurgency operations initially only involved the state police, who dealt 
with revolts as instances of anti-social and criminal behaviour. Then by 1970 colonial 
anti-terrorist acts  were reinstated and  paramilitary forces were deployed,  which 
ﬁnally culminated in the heavy hand of the Emergency from 1975 to1977. After the 
Emergency most in the establishment, as well as the intelligentsia who had  once 
supported the radical left wing movement, began writing obituaries that declared the 
revolution to be an adventurist campaign that had been erased for good (Roy 1975; 
Ray  1988). 
 
However, when the Emergency was lifted in 1977 surviving activists began to 
rethink their ideological and tactical views. Some, such as Satyanarayan Singh of the 
CPI(ML) in Bihar,  were willing to negotiate with the state in order to release 
prisoners and ﬁnd some legitimacy in the new political environment. In exchange for 
signing a declaration that they would support state policies, be patriotic and base 
their ideology on Marxism  rather than violence, the Home Minister Charan  Singh 
repealed the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) and released all Naxalite 
prisoners unconditionally (Gupta  2004). Others,  such as Kanu  Sanyal,  Asim 
Chatterjee and Souren Bose supported this initiative to restart the movement 
through open front organisations, but at the same time decided to prepare 
themselves for an armed revolution in the future. 
 
Thus, in the post-Emergency phase of the Naxalite  movement, there was a 
serious eﬀort by the main Naxalite parties such as the MCC, CPI(ML),  PWG and 
PU  to mobilize through front organisations as well as armed wings. While the front 
organisations  were the  main  party  organs  representing workers’  rights  in  the 
democratic mainstream and in electoral politics, the armed wings were meant to 
defend against incidents of repression in the short-term whilst also pursuing the more 
long-term aim of bringing about a radical change through armed revolution. Since 
then, as is well-known, there has been a gradual shift in preference  for the armed 
strategy. The more widely held explanation for this is that the Maoist’s ideology has 
trapped them into a spiral of violence against the state and their own internal 
factions, because of which they are now unwilling to give up their armed wings and 
partake in peaceful negotiation. However, what this explanation leaves out is the role 
that the central and state government’s systematic banning of front organisations of 
the extreme left has played in encouraging more underground activities and armed 
wings. 
 
 
 
 
 In Bihar, which became one of the main centres of the Naxalite movement in the 
post 1977 period, three of the main parties met with a similar fate. The CPI(ML), 
which was most unambiguous about pursuing a parliamentary path, ﬁrst launched 
Bihar  Pradesh Kisan  Sabha  (BPKS)   which carried out  a  successful village level 
campaign for land reform and wages (Louis 2000). Its electoral wing – the Indian 
People’s Front  – which was later disbanded and replaced by the CPI(ML), 
performed well in the state and assembly elections, winning one seat in the 1989 
parliamentary election and seven seats in the state assembly election. However, in 
1990 the Bihar  government banned the BPKS and  declared it  to  be  a  terrorist 
organization.  In  response, the CPI(ML)  in its 1992 state conference, referring 
speciﬁcally to the conditions in Bihar, decided that it would have to carry out armed 
struggles in  regions where there were private caste armies and  the  police  were 
continuing to repress their open fronts (Singh 1995). 
 
Similarly, PU  – which formed an open front organization called Mazdoor Kisan 
Sangram Samiti (MKSS) in 1982 for agricultural workers – was banned in 1986 after 
an encounter in which MKSS activists were gunned down by the police. The Bihar 
state blamed the MKSS for this incident and in 1987 it was re-launched under the 
name of Mazdoor  Kisan  Mukti  Manch,  taking on a much more militant character. 
 
Finally the MCC, which from the start had emphasised the armed strategy and 
jointly pursued front organizations such as the Krantikari Kisan Committee and an 
armed wing called the Lal Raksha Dal,  became intertwined with caste-based violence 
in Bihar. For responding to the private armies of the landowning Bhumihar, Kurmi 
and  Yadav  caste with annihilation campaigns and  massacres in upper caste 
dominated areas, it was condemned even by the CPI(ML) for degenerating into a 
caste-based murderous party (Bhatia 2000). 
 
In  Andhra  Pradesh, where the Naxalite  movement is much more deeply 
established as  a  parallel regime,  the response of  the state government has  been 
somewhat mixed.  Following  the death of  Charu  Mazumdar  in 1972, Kondapalli 
Seetharamaiah, Suniti Kumar Ghosh  and K.G. Sathyamurthy formed the 
Coordination  Committee of CPI(ML).  In the post-emergency period, they decided 
to avoid militancy until they were more fully prepared, but at the same time chose 
not to participate in elections. Later,  in 1980, Seetharamiah broke away from the 
COC CPI(ML) to form the PWG. This reﬂected a major split in the CPI(ML) which 
until then had deﬁned the dominant line of the Naxalite  Movement.  The rift was 
mainly due to a section of the leadership who believed that the pursuit of revolution 
through the legal and parliamentary path was gradually dissolving into a reactionary 
and opportunist campaign. The PWG was therefore formed with a view to revive the 
armed struggle that Charu Mazumdar had once encouraged, but through pursuing a 
mass-mobilised PW  rather than  selective annihilation campaigns that  often 
degenerated into individual terrorism. 
 
Eventually,  the  PWG  displaced the  CPI(ML)’s  hegemony over  the  Naxalite 
movement as it stretched its reach from its home turf in Andhra  Pradesh to Bihar 
when it merged with PU in 1982. Over  the next few years it spread into Orissa, 
Chattisgarh and West Bengal as it merged with smaller parties in these neighbouring 
regions.  Finally, in 2004, it merged with MCC, marking a signiﬁcant consolidation 
of the Naxalite  Movement which the PWG has gradually come to dictate over the 
last two decades. 
 
 
 The Andhra Pradesh government has been quite equivocal in its policy towards 
the Naxalites. While on the one hand there have been initiatives for peace processes 
and attempts to recognise the Naxalites  as part of the political mainstream, there 
have equally been attempts to curb them through stringent counter-insurgency 
measures including the ‘notorious’ Andhra Greyhounds, a well-trained antiguerrilla 
force that is immune from all legal safeguards. Over the years, evidence of mutual  
support between Naxalites  and  political parties during election campaigns 
(Balagopal  2006) has emerged at  the same time as a  sense of  mutual  suspicion, 
has developed as each side has gone back on its promises during brief periods of 
peaceful negotiation. Initially,  during his election campaigns in 1982 N.T. Rama 
Rao embraced Naxalites by calling them Deshabhaktulu (patriots) but later when he 
came in power in 1986 he declared war on revolutionaries and encouraged police 
camps and encounter killings. Later, in 1989, Chief Minister Chena Reddy launched 
a liberal policy which allowed Naxalites  to conduct public meetings and withheld 
police interference in their activities. Despite having a novel approach of legitimising 
Naxalite politics and carrying out development initiatives such as the Remote Areas 
Development Programme, the policy lasted only for a year. This time, the Naxalites 
were blamed for  exploiting  the  state’s soft  approach  in  order to  continue  with 
extortions and expand their arms base. Chenna Reddy decided to resume the hard- 
line after facing  criticism from  the opposition,  and  by  1992 PWG and  its front 
organisations were banned. 
 
Between 1994 and 2004, during the N.T. Rama  Rao  and Chandrababu  Naidu 
government, the state’s response to  the PWG became more focused on  counter- 
terrorism measures. While the need for  addressing socio-economic problems was 
recognised, the government refused to see Naxalite activists as anything other than 
terrorists and  criminals (Reddy  2008). As  the violence in  the state escalated, an 
attempt for  peace talks was made in 2002, but was aborted within three months 
amidst accusations from both parties. PWG activists reported police encounters that 
claimed the lives of  their key leaders, while the A.P. government suggested that 
Naxalites increased extortions when the ban was lifted. In 2004, hopes were renewed 
when the Congress government led by Rajashekhar Reddy began peace talks,  but 
even this was abandoned after two rounds of meetings. 
 
In order to respond to the Naxalite problem, the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs at the 
centre has periodically organised inter-state conferences in which there has been 
some sort of a consensus that the overall approach has to be a multi-pronged one, 
including police modernisation, developing co-ordinated intelligence networks 
between states, ﬁlling  critical  gaps  in  infrastructure and  development of  remote 
areas and persuading people through public grievance system and local resistance 
groups. However, the main responsibility lies with individual state governments who 
devise their own ways of dealing with left wing extremism, while the centre plays a 
supportive role by providing funds through diﬀerent central government 
programmes.1 
As  a result, 
 there are some variations in the policies that diﬀerent state governments have 
devised. The A.P. government, for instance, has relied on counter- insurgency 
measures punctuated by  peace talks,  most notably  in  May  2002 and October 
2004. However, there is some amount of scepticism that these peace talks usually 
occur after a new party comes into power,  therefore indicating a possible nexus 
between the PWG and the winning party (Balagopal 2006). Also, as the PWG has 
spread to other districts and the Naxalite movement is seen as national problem, 
other state governments consider meetings with PWG leaders as doing a disservice to 
 the overall strategy. The option of dialogue and negotiation has therefore gradually 
become quite remote. The oﬃcial verdict is that dialogue will be allowed only if the 
Naxalites completely give up their arms. 
 
Meanwhile,  in Chattisgarh  in June  2005, Mahendra  Karma,  a Congress Party 
leader,  devised Salwa Judum – a local resistance group comprising of tribal people 
who supposedly took up arms to defend themselves against the Naxalites. As part of 
an initiative to wean away popular support from the Naxalites, it resulted in one of 
the worst massacres in the region. Although  the campaign was later condemned in 
the Indian Parliament, it has had a more lasting eﬀect in introducing a policy 
wherein the same tribal activists are inducted as Special Police Oﬃcers or trained in 
the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Training College which was recently set 
up in the state. With this, development reform for tribal people seems to have taken a 
vicious turn. There are two options for the tribal youth – either to be a Naxalite 
activist who takes up arms against the state, or to become a government employee 
and direct their anger against the Naxalite. 
Elsewhere, the state governments of  Bihar,  Jharkhand  and Orissa have, since 
2005, introduced surrender policies for Naxalite activists. In order to encourage the 
rebels to return to the mainstream, they are given rehabilitation packages of Rs.  1.5 
lakhs ($1500)  which they can use after completing three years of  probation.  For 
every weapon they surrender they are given cash compensation – Rs  15,000 ($330) 
for an AK 47 to Rs.  3000 ($66) for a pistol. In addition, a monthly stipend of Rs. 
2000 ($50) to  undergo vocational  training,  a  bank  loan  guaranteed by  the 
government to start up a business and a house through the Indra Awaz Yojna  are 
also available. 
 
When Naxalite activists surrender to the police, it is hardly a secret operation but 
is a highly publicised media event. Recently, in Orissa in March 2010, when around 
25 Naxalites  –  mostly young  tribal  men from  Gajipur  district –  surrendered, it 
generated headlines. Between footage  of  AK-47   riﬂes laid  out  on  a  table  and 
emaciated and confused looking young men dressed in soldier’s costumes, the media- 
savvy police took centre stage, explaining that the activists chose to return to the 
state because they were disillusioned  by the ideology and violence advocated by the 
Naxalite  leaders. The  success was not  so  much  the  surrender and  possible 
rehabilitation of the frustrated youth,  but the state’s opportunity to direct its 
propaganda against the Naxalite movement. 
 
Still,  despite experimenting with diﬀerent policy strategies, the number of 
Naxalite attacks in India has levelled at an average of 1561 between  2004 and 2008 
(see Table 1). The intensity of violence, which is the number of deaths per attack, has 
increased marginally from 0.44% to 0.45% in the period from 2008 to 2009. From 
these statistics two  issues stand  out.  One  is  that  despite policy  initiatives that 
combine the security and the development approach,  the level of  violence has 
remained stable. The second is that contrary to reports that Naxalites  are in 
possession of sophisticated weapons, it appears that the intensity of their attacks has 
not signiﬁcantly increased. Part of the reason why left wing extremism does not seem 
to  have been quelled, despite attempts to  address the root  cause as  well as  the 
symptoms, is to do with the way in which the problem of Naxalism is represented. I 
turn to this question in the following sections where I  evaluate the three types of 
representations and the particular policy approaches of which they are constituted. 
 
  
 
 
Table 1.     State-wise incidents of Naxalite violence from 2004 to 2008. 
 
State-wise Naxalite violence from 2004–2008 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
States Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths 
 
Andhra Pradesh 310 74 535 208 183 47 138 45 92 46 
Bihar 323 171 186 96 107 45 135 67 164 73 
Chattisgarh 352 83 385 168 715 388 582 369 620 242 
Jharkhand  379 169 312 119 310 124 482 157 484 207 
Madhya  Pradesh 13  4 20   3  6   1   9  2   7 – 
Maharashtra 84 15 94 53 98 42 94 25 68  22 
Orissa 35 8 42 14 44 9 67 17 103 101 
Uttar  Pradesh 15 26 10 1 11 5 9 3 4 – 
West Bengal 11 15 14 7 23 17 32 6 35 26 
Kerala  5 –  –  –   2 – 8 –  2 – 
Karnataka  6  1  8  8 10 – 7  5 8  4 
Haryana  – – –  – – –  1 –  2 – 
Tamil Nadu  – –  2 – – –  1 –  2 – 
Total   1533  566  1608  677  1509  678 1565  696 1591   721 
 
Source: Ministry of Home Aﬀairs,  Annual  Report 2008–2009. 
  
Naxalite  movement as terrorism: policy of control and containment Soon after the 
ﬁrst incident of land grabbing in Naxalbari  in May  1967, the police forces decided 
on some guidelines on their attitude towards the ‘miscreants’. While they were ﬁrm 
in their resolve to end lawlessness, they decided that a humane and restrained 
attitude on  the part of  the forces would help them win the trust and conﬁdence 
of  the people (Mukherjee 2007). Even  the statement issued by the Communist  
government, which described the activists as ‘law-breakers’ and condemned their 
violent methods, accepted that the peasants may have just grievances over the 
feudal land distribution system (Statement of  Chief  Minister Ajay  Kumar  
Mukherji May  1967, cited in Mukhopadhyay  2006). 
 
It  was later, in 1970, that oﬃcial discourse associated the terms ‘terrorist’ and 
‘extremist’ with Naxalites.  These terms provided the basis for reviving the Bengal 
Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act  1936 in September 1970, and for passing the 
Prevention of Violent Activities Bill in November 1970. The representation of the 
Naxalite Movement as ‘terrorist’ followed from counter-terrorism legislation which 
allowed the police to  act with impunity, rather than the actions of  the so-called 
‘militants’  themselves. From  hereon,  instead of  taking  ‘appropriate action,’  the 
police – aided by the army – were instructed to take ‘unusual’ and ‘bold’  steps in 
order to confront the ‘unusual’ crisis situation (Calcutta Police Gazette,  23 October 
1970, cited in Mukhopadhyay  2006). During  the Emergency,  the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act 1971 was applied against Naxalite leaders to arrest them on the 
charge of being a threat to national security. Later,  in 2002, the BJP  government 
used the Prevention of Terrorist Atrocities Act (POTA)  to arrest suspected Naxalites 
without warrants.2  This was repealed by the Congress-led UPA government, which 
repackaged the bulk of the POTA provisions in the Unlawful Activities Prevention 
Act  1967. 
 
To a large extent, the main purpose of ﬁxing the label ‘terrorist’ on Naxalites is to 
aid  indiscriminate arrests of  people who are suspected of  being activists or 
supporters, because through these legislations the regular norms and procedures as 
well as civil liberties involved in arrests and enquiries are suspended. Although these 
exceptional powers have been invoked as  short-term measures to  curb  Naxalite 
violence, most of the provisions of these laws have become a permanent part of the 
legal system and therefore stretch the state’s exceptional powers indeﬁnitely (Tharu 
2007). 
 
The association of the Naxalite Movement with terrorism and insurgency gives 
way to a whole set of security measures to contain the movement – from deploying 
the army and paramilitary forces, to setting up police camps in the rural hinterland, 
establishing jungle warfare training  institutes, more surveillance and  intelligence 
networks, arrests without evidence and the use of  torture in police enquiries. 
However, as Shamuel Tharu (2007) indicates, given that the legal sanction to invoke 
exceptional powers is already in place and the state does not need to  justify the 
breaking of rules in its handling of the Naxalite problem, the constitutive role that 
the ‘terrorist’ label plays in escalating the crisis to the point that it needs 
extraordinary methods of containment enters diﬀerent arenas. 
 
One  such arena is the two-pronged policy of  treating the Naxalite  insurgency 
with law and order and socio-economic methods. Even as there is suﬃcient evidence 
that the root cause of the problem lies in inequality and development and therefore 
needs eﬀective policies oriented in this direction, the logic of  Naxalite  ‘terrorism’ 
 helps sustain the basis of the security policy. Within this framework, while the state 
recognises the  grievances that  cause radical  rebellion, it  does not  recognise the 
legitimacy of  the activists themselves. Therefore, in colouring the Naxalite 
Movement mainly through the illegitimacy of the violence used by non-state actors, 
the state ﬁnds the legitimacy for establishing its own monopoly over violence and for 
continuing  its  security policy  which  is  meant  to  end  only  when the  Naxalites  
completely abjure violence and surrender their arms (Ministry of Home Aﬀairs 2008, 
2009). 
The terrorism argument plays a crucial role in drawing a concrete and impermeable 
line between the oﬀender – the threat, the enemy, the insurgent who is external to 
society – and the victim, the disgruntled poor, young, unemployed, tribals who are easy 
recruits for the movement. Rejecting the possibility that the victims could themselves 
have turned into rebels, this approach advances two contradictory propositions. For 
the ‘rebels’ who only understand the language of violence strong action would be 
needed, whereas the ‘poor recruits’ who inadvertently join the movement would have 
to be rehabilitated back into the mainstream. On one occasion, the Home Minister 
Shivraj Patil, when arguing for alternatives to a coercive approach towards Naxalites, 
suggested that unlike insurgents in Kashmir, Naxalites are ‘our brothers and sisters,’ 
and could be brought back to the mainstream through negotiation and the provision of 
jobs (Lok Sabha Debate, from hereon LSD, Patil 2005a). Some members of parliament 
challenged this remark by re-asserting that those who engage in proxy war are a threat, 
and therefore cannot be regarded as members of Indian society (LSD Malhotra 2006). 
They  went on  to  caution that any attempt by the state to  negotiate with armed 
insurgents would indicate ambiguity and softness in its counter-terrorist policy, and 
insurgents would only harness this to consolidate their strength (LSD Mahtab  2005; 
Swain 2006). Therefore, linking the Naxalite movement with terrorism not only makes 
the distinction between the target groups for the welfare and coercive policies possible, 
but also suggests that this distinction is necessary for state survival and legitimacy. 
 
In  the  representational framework of  terrorism, the  identity of  the  Naxalite 
activist is abstracted from the speciﬁcs of who he is, or why and how he comes to 
exist. Instead, the Naxalite  movement is seen as a scourge that creates disorder in 
society, or a phenomenon that is unnatural and unexplainable. At  best, the 
movement is seen as a form of organised violence that is expansionist and driven 
solely by the pursuit of power. 
 
When  the  movement is  collapsed into  other  forms  of  terrorism,  its  political 
ideology of class struggle becomes largely irrelevant. It has to be seen for what it is – 
criminal, violent and unredeemable. The association with terrorism also suggests that 
its politics is based on radicalisation of the poor. However, in a sense it is even more 
dangerous than religious radicalism because the extreme views are directed on the 
areas that the state has neglected or failed to deliver. In response, it asks for a politics 
of  consensus-building and  unanimity from  the state representatives.  For  instance, 
when discussing incidents of Naxalite violence, time and again members of parliament 
are urged to speak from a non-political stance,  to use their platform for agreement 
rather than debate and to refrain from partisanship (Chaliha 2004; Patil 2005b). 
 
While  the  problem of  Naxalite  terrorism sanctions policies for  development 
reform, it highlights that these should always be considered in conjunction with the 
security approach. It is advised that even criticisms of state performance and police 
action in dealing with the crisis are acceptable, as long as such a critical approach is 
also adopted in regard to the terrorists and their actions (LSD Patil 2005b). There is 
an  underlying anxiety amongst those who use the terrorist lens that  those who 
 privilege the need for the socio-economic approach dilute the urgency to contain 
violence and provide an undue rationality to criminal activity by describing it as a 
class struggle (Kumar 2005; Mahtab  2005; LSD Patil 2005b). 
 
As a result, in the policy discourse that approaches the problems of Naxalism as 
terrorism, development programmes are  seen as  part  of  the  overall  process of 
counter-terrorism.  In  an  interview,  the  Director  of  the  Counter-Insurgency  and 
Jungle Warfare Training School  in Chattisgarh describes  civic action amongst the 
villagers as a feature of one type of counter-insurgency operation called patrolling 
(Srivastava 2008). When forces patrol an area, development activities facilitate local 
linkages by building the villagers’ trust and respect for the establishment. They are 
thus able to gain access to information about the enemy, as well as divert the 
villagers’ loyalty away from the Naxalites to the state. 
 
Finally, development is considered as some kind of palliative that calms the anger 
and frustration in the minds of the neglected and poor who live in forest areas. In 
this respect, development is part of an overall strategy of containing violence, which 
involves reassuring the marginalised through development activities in their areas as 
well as instructing them about  the beneﬁts of  modernisation (Kumar  2004; LSD 
Chakraborty  2005; Kumar  2005; Patil 2005b; Rao  2009). As  if,  the tribals are the 
subjects of  change and reform and not the development policies that cause their 
anger and frustration. 
 
 
Naxalite  movement as a parallel regime: policy of reforming and re-legitimising 
the state 
 
Between the  Naxalite   Movement  and  the  Indian  state  there  is  what  may  be 
described as a causal relationship. The general view is that since the post-colonial 
Indian  state  has  failed  to  bring  about  an  eﬃcient delivery mechanism for  its 
poverty alleviation and rural development programmes over the last 60 years, the 
Naxalite  Movement  has entered the rural milieu by  providing the basic services 
which the state has failed to deliver. Gradually,  it has set up a parallel regime not 
only  through  terror  tactics  but  by  ﬁlling  up  the  vacuum  that  existed in  the 
absence of  the  state’s  administrative machinery (Ahuja  and  Ganguly   2007). In 
areas far-removed from  the formal  judicial system, it  has set up  people’s courts 
which, although infamous for  their ruthless judgements, oﬀer a  speedy and 
inexpensive alternative for the poor and subordinate groups. They have had some 
success in redistributing land from powerful and unpopular landlords to  the 
landless. Minimum  wages have been set up,  most notably  for  those who collect 
minor  forest  produce  like  tendu  leaves  along  with  introducing  other  develop- 
mental activities such as schools,  mobile medical units,  irrigation reservoirs and 
community kitchens (Louis  2000; Bhatia  2006; Garg  2008). 
 
This causal relationship, which results from the Naxalites inﬁltrating the areas 
where the state is remote or even absent, goes hand in hand with another relationship 
– that of the nexus and the complicities  between them. This, in a sense, tarnishes the 
self-image of the Naxalite as a sort a Robin  Hood  ﬁgure who takes from the state- 
elite nexus to save the poor,  but also equally throws scepticism on the oﬃcial state 
which is seemingly, in its rhetoric, at war with the Naxalites.  The continuities 
between the state and the Naxalites take shape in the informal economy, as Kelly 
and Shah (2006) uncloak from the market of protection in Jharkhand,  wherein the 
MCC cadre, like state oﬃcials in the past, sell protection to local entrepreneurs and 
 state oﬃcers to secure their share of the illicit cut from the revenue that is allotted for 
development schemes in the area. While the oﬃcial story blames the Naxalites for 
disrupting development by  perpetuating an  extortion racket,  the realities on  the 
ground show that this illegitimate economy pre-dated the Maoists and what is more 
is a self-creation of the state itself.  
 
The Maoist links that Kelly and Shah (2006) make visible are what Harris-White 
(2003)  describes as the ‘shadow state’ – a  network of  brokers, advisers, political 
workers and crooks who have surrounded the oﬃcial state, depriving it of its funds 
to secure the private beneﬁt of those involved. Over the years, while the ‘oﬃcial’ state 
introduced the Public Distribution System and disbursed funds for the Integrated 
Rural Development Programme, rich landlords complicit with the bureaucracy 
perpetuated an economy based on black marketing, hoarding and bypassing the law 
(Ahuja and Ganguly  2007). So,  the oﬃcial state had already begun to be hollowed 
out by the shadow state and when the Maoists stepped in they struck where the state 
was weakest – its own illegitimate by-product. They developed further links with this 
shadow state to establish themselves in the locality and then gradually took over as 
the leaders of this parallel administration. 
 
The threat that the Naxalite Movement poses therefore follows not only from the 
security imperative based on its growing military strength and having its eyes on 
capturing the state, but also from a much deeper issue of the political legitimacy of 
the state. The spatial spread of  areas where Maoists’  have set up a parallel 
administration is therefore worrying, not because it could potentially form a red 
corridor across India and then eventually take over Delhi as the oﬃcial story goes, 
but because it strikes at the very core of the state, its own political subjectivity. The 
policies that emerge from representing Naxalism as a result of state failure are aimed 
towards restoring the political legitimacy of  the state, as will be explained 
subsequently. 
 
In the State-Naxalite framework, the Naxalite takes the meaning and substance 
of its own subjectivity from the subjectivity of the state, more precisely the decline in 
subjectivity of the state. Without the failure of the state in delivering basic services, 
there would be no Naxalite. And thus follows the explanation that the Naxalite – by 
ﬁlling the absence of the state machinery – has emerged as a parallel administration, 
to the extent that it looks like a mirror image of the state – power-hungry, bloated 
with  extortion  and  corruption,  oppressive to  the  people  over  whom  it  claims 
responsibility. However, even though their subjectivities are so mutually constitutive, 
in order to restore the state’s now degenerating subjectivity, the Naxalite is imagined 
as some sort of  a  disease from  which the state suﬀers. In  the presence of  some 
pathological conditions linked to the functioning of the state – abdication of 
responsibility, remote areas within its jurisdiction, corruption, poverty – Naxalism is 
more likely to occur (see Harivansh 2008). The state is the infected as well as the 
cause of  the disease which has  to  be cured,  while Naxalism  is the symptom of 
the disease which has to be removed. So,  ultimately the question turns back not to 
the problematic political identity that Naxalism itself poses, but to the political 
subjectivity of  the state and potential disruption it faces because of  its emerging 
mirror reﬂection in the Naxalite. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Seen through the lens of the victim-oﬀender framework which underpins the dual 
policy,  it appears as though the state is the victim, the Naxalite is the oﬀender and 
the people are the determining variables, who shift their loyalties and patronage 
based on which side performs better in delivering their needs. As part of restoring the 
state’s legitimacy, the policies are designed to win back  the people from the 
Naxalites. 
 
The  politics of  the  Naxalite  Movement  is  imagined as  opportunist and  as 
aimed towards the capture of power. In the Expert’s Report  for the Ministry of 
Home  Aﬀairs  (2008), even though  Naxalite  activities are associated with those  
responsibilities which  the  welfare state has  abdicated,  the  Naxalites  are 
debunked  for  not  wishing  to  hand  over  their  functions  to  the  state.  Their 
political activity is illegitimate, or rather illegitimised, against the state’s own 
legitimacy over rule or control. Thus, the conclusion is that Naxalites ﬂourish 
where  there  is  no   political  activity  and   disrupt  key  parts  of   the  political 
machinery – such as elections and state administration – in order to set up their 
own parallel regime. 
 
However, away from the rhetoric, on the ground the political identities of the 
state and the Naxalite often collude, and this is damaging to the political credibility 
of both. In forging undercover links with the enemy, in order to win elections and to 
push development contracts for their constituencies, state oﬃcials put at stake the 
legitimacy of the state. And in courting the state, the Naxalites suggest that there is 
hypocrisy between their anti-state rhetoric and their actions. This became evident 
during the Lok Sabha elections in 2009 when, while in principle Naxalites boycotted 
elections and even disrupted polling booths in some regions, during the state 
assembly elections in Jharkhand some Maoist leaders even stood as candidates from 
prisons (Times News Network 2009). While the Naxalites explain their actions by 
claiming that they participate in elections to show the ﬂaws in the system, in the 
larger scheme of things the state oﬃcials can earn their credibility back by keeping 
away from the Naxalite and showing that they can survive without their support. Yet 
for the Naxalites to earn legitimacy they have to neutralise their politics or assimilate 
with the state. 
 
In  dealing with the problem of  the parallel regime that Naxalites  have built, 
development is closely linked to restoring state legitimacy. At  one level, it pushes 
good governance higher up in the agenda. In order to eﬀectively implement its two- 
pronged policy of security and development, the state ﬁrst has to clean up its own act 
by removing corruption and lawlessness (Srivastava 2009). Moreover, the state has 
to devolve from the statuettes in its policy papers to actual physical presence with its 
grassroots, just as the Naxalites have done so far. Eﬀectively, this is part of a broader 
strategy which one politician described as separating the ﬁsh – the Naxalites,  from 
the water – their local support base. By proving more eﬃcient administration and 
gaining more visibility amongst the people, the state can win back the public loyalty 
it had lost to the Naxalites. 
 
This development approach also operates at a second level – that of 
delegitimizing the functions that Naxalites have been fulﬁlling. Evidence of Naxalites 
taking levies from allocated development funds feeds into their anti-development 
image. As  power-hungry extortionists who survive on sabotaging the development 
process,  Naxalites renew the political legitimacy of the developmental state. Some 
security analysts have advised the state to  publicise the evidence of  Naxalite 
corruption and  degeneration to  win back  popular  support (Kumar  2008; Kujur 
 2009). As  for those developmental functions which the Naxalites have carried out 
with much success, such as land redistribution and forest rights, the state 
appropriates within its own legal framework while at  the same time discrediting 
the inﬂuence of the Naxalites. Finally, although the salience of a political solution is 
highlighted over a  military one,  as the internal enemy that keeps the state from 
reaching its remote population, the Naxalite  Movement provides a continuing 
sanction for coercive measures. In the name of providing security for development, 
more roads and  highways are planned under the Pradhan  Mantri  Gram  Sadak 
Yojna  (PMGSY) to enable police and military forces to enter, more police camps are  
set to patrol forests and more deals with private investors are settled under air raids 
over the tribal heartland. 
 
 
Naxalite  movement as a political disorder: policy to normalize and discipline 
political action 
 
When  the  Naxalite   Movement  is  recognised as  a  particular  kind  of   political 
struggle, it privileges an approach based on dialogue and negotiation in order to 
bring the movement into the political mainstream. However, even though this 
perspective focuses on  the  ‘political  identity’  that  the  Naxalite  Movement 
represents, it  addresses it  as  a   problem  not  just  for   itself  but  also  for   the 
boundaries within which resistance is deemed acceptable in  a  parliamentary 
democracy. So, while there is a kind of implicit approval, particularly from left wing 
parties, for  the political cause that the movement stands for,  across the political 
spectrum its  choice  of  violence is  condemned.  As  a  result,  the  critique of  the 
Naxalite  Movement as ‘undemocratic,’ ‘totalitarian’ and ‘violent’ is intended to 
discipline radical left wing politics so that it can ﬁt into the framework of 
parliamentary democracy. Inadvertently,  however, this results in re-legitimising the 
basic  premises on  which the  neo-liberal order is  based,  while treating calls  for 
radical transformation as somewhat elusive and  impossible. The  prelude for  the 
entry of Naxalite  Movement into mainstream politics is therefore to strip it oﬀ its 
radical political characteristics (Giri  2009). 
 
There are three ways in which Naxalism  is described as a problematic political 
struggle. One  that  is associated with its ideological ally,  the Communist  parties 
CPI   and CPI(M), describes it as a  ‘political  disorder’ (Ramana  2008). Although 
both   consider  the  Indian   state  as  semi-colonial  and   semi-feudal,  unlike  the 
Maoists  the Communist  parties do not want to overthrow the state but to direct 
it  towards  being  a   welfare  state  within  the  realities  of   a   neo-liberal  global 
economy.  It  is  from  this  point  of  departure that  the  subsequent dissolution of 
Naxalite  politics begins. The Naxalites are criticised for deteriorating the ideology 
of  class struggle by  playing with emotions and  frustration to  advance an  armed 
revolution. They have not understood the true character of the Indian state, as 
Ramana  (2008) argues, not  just in  their estimation of  the scale of  its repressive 
potential but also in the fact that the Indian state is not entirely conservative and 
reactionary, but accommodative of people’s demands as long as they are made 
through mass movements. 
 
The critique therefore becomes an occasion to assert the possibilities within the 
Indian  democratic system, with a people-friendly and accommodating state at its 
core,  as well as to  suggest the potential success of  the democratic class struggle 
which has understood the ‘true’ character of  the existing political system. In  one 
sweep,  Naxalism  as an alternative political force is pushed out of  the boundaries 
 within which acceptable politics takes place. Acceptable politics is that which 
recognises the legitimacy of  the state’s developmental and repressive  powers and 
makes demands within these constraints. Often  in  the Legislative Assembly,  the 
Communist government in West Bengal is cited as an example where Naxalism was 
successfully contained because the state seriously took  up redistributive measures 
within its policy apparatus (Singh 2004; Sar  2005). In  drawing links between 
Communists in power and the end of Naxalism,  the democratic left actually reaps 
the beneﬁts of the existence of the radical left, in order to expand its own political  
avenues rather than the state repression  it often accuses its ideological partner of 
bringing about. 
 
A   second perspective on  the  Naxalite  Movement  sees it  as  a  kind  or 
epiphenomenon or  by-product  of  the failure of  the existing system (Giri  2009). 
Here, the long-term ideology of state capture is set aside and seen instead as some 
kind of local service provider which meets the day-to-day needs of  the poor.  The 
focus is not so much on Naxalite  politics for what it is, but rather on the socio- 
economic conditions in which it takes place (Planning Commission 2008; Roy 2009). 
Unlike  the view that the Naxalite  Movement is a wide-scale revolutionary struggle 
that threatens to take over all of India, this view suggests that its eﬀect is very much 
localised and representative of the poorest and neediest amongst India’s population. 
While it dismisses the internal security challenge that the movement can potentially 
pose, it asks for  the building of  more continuities between the services Naxalites 
provide and the state’s policy apparatus.  Even here Naxalite  politics is reduced to 
mere rhetoric and sloganeering, and the focus is rather on grasping the conditions 
that  make  the  movement possible, such  that  it  underlines the need for  a  more 
eﬃcient welfare state. 
 
Finally,  the Naxalite  Movement is seen from the perspective of organizational 
politics (Kujur  2008). From  the history of  the diﬀerent political formations that 
make up the Naxalite  Movement, it is suggested that it is a  well-organized 
mobilization founded on a strong institutional base and a core leftist ideology which 
it  has  sustained  over  the  years.  Contrary   to  perspectives which  consider  the 
movement to  have weakened because of  in-ﬁghting between factions and 
deterioration of  its ideological  base,  this  perspective asks that  the movement is 
thought of as a force to be reckoned with. Here the urge to keep in mind the politics 
of  Naxalism  is really a  call  to  consider its organizational base and  the political 
manoeuvres its leading parties have been making in order to design an eﬀective way 
of countering it. This view of the Naxalite Movement as a serious political force is to 
some extent inﬂuenced by the example of the Maoists in Nepal (LSD Radhakrishnan 
2006). Occasionally  mentioned  in  the  context  of   advocating  peace  talks  with 
Maoists, here the intention is to keep the possibility of dialogue open so that Maoists 
can be brought back into mainstream politics. 
 
Overall, in assessing the Naxalite movement as a problematic political struggle, 
the response is based on two basic objectives – to reform the politics such that it 
subscribes to  the rule of  the democratic system or  to  overcome it  through state 
policies by  eﬀectively addressing the grievances on  which it  is based. While  this 
perspective keeps the door open for alternatives to coercion, in de-legitimising the 
politics of Naxalism it does not completely eliminate the security approach. Instead 
by basing politics on the fear of possible state repression, it further disciplines and 
contains the space for dissent. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
In  this article, I  have sought to  investigate how a  two-pronged policy approach, 
which links development with the imperative for security and state survival, impinges 
on the ideas and practice of  development. In  responding to a problem associated 
with poverty and inequality through a combination of military and development 
instruments, a distinction is made between two policy subjects – the angry rebel and 
the neglected poor – who could often reﬂect two sides of the same person. Therefore,  
even though the two policies are meant for diﬀerent policy subjects, they are 
ultimately aimed  at  addressing the  same problem,  namely the  rise of  left  wing 
extremism. As a result, in the process of controlling internal dissent there are points 
at which security and development goals coincide with each other. By  looking  at 
three representations of the problem of Naxalism I have attempted to make visible 
these points of convergence – from the way in which the problem and the subject of 
intervention is deﬁned, from the way in which development  measures are prescribed 
and from the way in which the developmental state and its security apparatus is 
legitimised. 
 
Each of the three types of representation that we have looked at tilts the scales of 
the law and order approach and the socio-economic approach to diﬀerent levels. In 
the Naxalism as terrorism version, development initiatives are collapsed within the 
security imperative and are taken as part of  the counter-insurgency  strategy. The 
Naxalite  Movement  as  a  parallel regime account  focussed mainly  on  the socio- 
economic approach, but oriented it towards restoring the state’s political legitimacy. 
Finally,  the version that viewed the Naxalite  Movement as a problematic political 
struggle kept the door open for non-coercive means such as peace talks and political 
mainstreaming, but at the same time sought to ‘normalise’ politics within the reality 
of a neo-liberal state that is intolerant of violent resistance. 
 
Overall, the eﬀect of linking development with security has the eﬀect of feeding 
development goals into security goals such as state legitimacy,  state survival and 
maintaining the stability of the system. As a result, even though more funds are given 
through  diﬀerent state and  central government initiatives to  help neglected and 
relatively backward regions to  catch  up,  it  does not  necessarily transform those 
aspects of development which caused violent resistance in the ﬁrst place. Instead it 
lends a kind of urgency to development – the speedier that development initiatives 
can show results, the more eﬀective it will be in winning back the support of the poor 
and  the  legitimacy of  the  developmental state.  Consequently,  the  response has 
concentrated more on increasing the visibility and pace of development activities – 
through funds for backwards regions,  contracts to construct roads and highways, 
employment guarantee acts  and  posting more police  oﬃcers and  administrative 
personnel in remote areas. In  contrast, the eﬀort to change some negative 
consequences of  development, such  as  instituting a  legally  binding  resettlement 
and rehabilitation policy or changing the terms of Special Economic Zones for 
private investors, has been much slower. 
 
A more critical eﬀect of the development security link has been in the creation of 
an ‘internal enemy’. In the name of ﬂushing out dissenters who stand in the way of 
development, coercive measures can be taken to erase contestation and resistance 
around state-directed development. 
 
 
 
 
 On  the other hand,  with the advent of  security discourse into non-traditional 
issues associated with human security (livelihood, food  and identity), it may have 
been possible for security to have been broadened beyond traditional concerns of 
state survival and military strength. However, in response to left wing insurgency in 
India, security discourse has dissolved developmental  issues within its scope, to the 
extent that when pressing concerns of  poverty are seen through the security lens 
these are taken as part of an existential threat, a non-debateable issue vital to the 
survival of the country. The issue of poverty is taken from the logic of emancipation 
of the slow and deliberative politics of democracy and universal norms, to the logic 
of security where politics is based on exceptions as well as urgency and speed. To 
conclude I would suggest that a meaningful response to the rise of left wing 
extremism would be one that is cautious of the eﬀects that a narrow security lens can 
have on development. Poverty and inequality are crucial to human security, but at 
the same time have to be addressed through democratic politics. Instead of directing 
development towards state survival, a  tighter link  between development and 
guarantees for socio-economic justice would be better placed to resolve the problem. 
And  ﬁnally, it is important to recognise the extreme left as a political movement in 
order to keep the space for negotiation open. Politics that arms the poor with the 
ideology of  violence,  however illegitimate, can only be resolved if it is negotiated 
with as one kind of political demand. 
 
Notes 
1.    The development programmes include the following: Backward Development Initiative, 
Backward Regions Grant Fund, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna,  National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and National Rural Health 
Mission  Scheme. The security programmes include the following: security-related 
expenditure through which state governments are reimbursed some of the costs incurred 
for building its law and order apparatus, Police Modernization Scheme and the 
deployment of paramilitary forces. 
2.    In Jharkhand alone, as Kelly and Shah (2006) observes, by 2004, 234 people were arrested, 
more than 650 had cases pending against them and more than 3200 people were named as 
involved in terrorist activities. 
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